Outstanding translations by leading contemporary scholars--many commissioned especially for this volume--are presented here in the first single edition to include the entire surviving corpus of works attributed to Plato in antiquity. In his introductory essay, John Cooper explains the presentation of these works, discusses questions concerning the chronology of their composition, comments on the dialogue form in which Plato wrote, and offers guidance on approaching the reading and study of Plato's works. Also included are concise introductions by Cooper and Hutchinson (...) to each translation, meticulous annotation designed to serve both scholar and general reader, and a comprehensive index. This handsome volume offers fine paper and a high-quality Smyth-sewn cloth binding in a sturdy, elegant edition. (shrink)

Jurgen Habermas' construction of a critical social theory of society grounded in communicative reason is one of the very few real philosophical inventions of recent times that demands and repays extended engagement. In this elaborate and sympathetic study which places Habermas' project in the context of critical theory as a whole past and future, J. M. Bernstein argues that despite its undoubted achievements, it contributes to the very problems of ethical dislocation and meaninglessness it aims to diagnose and remedy. Bernstein (...) further argues that the precise character of the failures of Habermas' program demonstrate the necessity for a return to the first generation critical theory of Adorno. Reading across nearly the whole range of Habermas' corpus, Recovering Ethical Life traces the development of the theory of communicative reason from its inception in Knowledge and Human Interests through its elaboration in The Theory of Communicative Action and into its defense against postmodernism in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity . In separate chapters Habermas' readings of Freud, Durkheim amd Mead, Adorno and Foucault, Castoriadis and Taylor are critically examined. The focus of Bernstein's analyses, however, is always problem centered and thematic rather than textual psychoanalytic theory as an account of self knowledge, the competing claims of ethical identity and moral reason, the place of judgment in practical reason, and the debate between philosophies of language based communities versus those oriented towards world-disclosure. Critical theory is unique among current philosophies in engaging with the problems of social injustice and nihilism by siding with an abstract moral reason that forfeits the processes of intersubjective recognition it intended to salvage. Even in the fine grain of Habermas' account of performative contradictions and the theory of discourses of application, Bernstein perceives a squandering of the resources of an ethical life in need of transfiguration. (shrink)

Arguably, the most promising and compelling route to demonstrating the significance of Hegel’s thought to contemporary philosophy has been the series of recent readings that construe Hegel as continuing and completing Kant’s Copernican turn. Paul Redding explicitly locates his interpretation within this program, seeing the hermeneutic dimension of Hegel’s thought as providing for the possibility of continuing the Kantian project. Kant’s Copernican turn can be loosely stated as the procedure of reflectively uncovering unexperienced conditions of experience that contribute to the (...) nature of experience in ways that require its further re-determination and re-description. What a hemeneutic take on this reflective procedure adds is that foremost among those conditions are contexts of intersubjective or dialogical relations—structures of recognition. While perhaps disappointing to anyone interested in the problem of textual interpretation, there is finally nothing more to Redding’s account of Hegel’s “hermeneutics” than the establishing of recognitive structures as forming the ultimate horizon of human experience. I take Redding’s relentless tracking of the problem of recognition to be one of his book’s virtues. (shrink)

Four years after completing his Ph.D. on “The Psychology of Kant,” one of Peirce’s most famous students, John Dewey, published a compendium of Leibniz’s main theses, his 1888 Leibniz’s New Essays.1 Such a move from critical to pre-critical rationalism seems to echo Peirce’s judgment that to fully understand Kant, a thorough familiarity with Leibniz’s philosophy is an indispensable preliminary (N 2:186, 1899); for Kant himself “was reposing in a firm belief in the metaphysics of Leibnitz as theologized by Wolff when (...) he first read the book of Hume.” (W 1:104, 1863) Peirce himself started his reflection with the study of Kant’s thought. The purpose of the present paper is to demonstrate that his actual implicit.. (shrink)

Le philosophe américain Charles S. Peirce ne trouva, malgré ses efforts, guère d’interlocuteurs en France. On le considéra comme un mathématicien et logicien, un physicien et un psychologue fiable, mais son œuvre philosophique fut systématiquement distordue au gré des controverses franco-françaises. Nous mettons l’accent sur les lectures d’André Lalande et de Louis Couturat qui contribuèrent néanmoins à faire reconnaître en France l’originalité du père du pragmaticisme.Despite his efforts, the American philosopher Charles S. Peirce found hardly any interlocutors in France. He (...) was considered mostly as a mathematician and logician, a physicist and a reliable psychologist, but his philosophical work was systematically distorted in consequence of “Franco-French” disputes. We emphasize here the readings of André Lalande and Louis Couturat who made significant contributions towards the recognition in France of the originality of the founding father of Pragmaticism. (shrink)

The nonmetaphysical interpretation of Hegel's philosophy asserts that the metaphysical reading is not credible and so his philosophy must be rationally reconstructed so as to elide its metaphysical aspects. This article shows that the thesis of the extended mind approaches the metaphysical reading, thereby undermining denials of its credibility and providing the resources to articulate and defend the metaphysical reading of Hegel's philosophy. This fully rehabilitates the metaphysical Hegel. The article does not argue for the truth of the metaphysical Hegel's (...) claims. Rather, it defends the correctness of reading his philosophy as metaphysical. (shrink)

This article discusses Habermas' rejections of the orthodoxy of the philosophy of history, ethical socialism, and scientism. It urges that his attempt to derive rationality and morality from consensus fails, and so he does lapse into ethical socialism. However, ethical socialism only appears to be something to avoidbecause of his belief that consensus could generate rationality and morality. Once the impossibility of that is recognized, ethical socialism can be rehabilitated. Hence, Althusser's version of ethical socialism escapes Habermas' censure.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Hegel and the Problem of Beginning: Scepticism and Presuppositionlessness by Robb DUNPHYJ. M. FritzmanDUNPHY, Robb. Hegel and the Problem of Beginning: Scepticism and Presuppositionlessness. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2023. x + 213 pp. Cloth, $105.00This rich, learned, and important book investigates and critically evaluates how, according to Hegel, philosophy should begin. Briefly stated, the problem of beginning philosophy is that any beginning seems susceptible to a skeptical (...) challenge that takes the form of a dilemma. On the one side, if philosophy begins immediately with a presuppositionless assertion, skeptics will contend that it is dogmatic. On the other side, if philosophy begins mediately with a claim that presupposes an argument, skeptics will confront each premise of that argument with a trilemma: The premise is either only a dogmatic assertion; it is the conclusion of an argument whose premises must in turn be justified (which threatens an infinite regress); or it depends on an argument that is viciously circular. Hegel solves this problem with a beginning that is simultaneously immediate and mediate.The introduction explains that this book has three goals. First, it critically analyzes the problem of beginning, showing how Hegel responds to the skeptical challenge. Second, it explains how Hegel’s approach to the problem and his solution are informed by his deep engagement with the tradition of Pyrrhonian skepticism. Finally, it provides a guide to reading Hegel’s essay “With What Must the Beginning of the Science be Made?” in the Science of Logic.Chapter 1, “Hegel and Pyrrhonian Scepticism,” presents the essentials of Pyrrhonism and Hegel’s interpretation of it. Pyrrhonism is a way of life. It aims to find an equally good counterargument for every argument it encounters, thus leading to a suspension of judgment that allows the skeptic to live in a state of undisturbedness. Pyrrhonism presents encountered arguments with a trilemma: Either they depend on dogmatic assertions; they generate an infinite regress of arguments; or they are viciously circular. Hegel’s interpretation emphasizes skepticism’s equipollence, whereby it opposes every argument with a counterargument that is equally persuasive. Viewed historically, Pyrrhonism seems to have confronted arguments only as it happened to encounter them and to have restricted itself to epistemology. However, Hegel is open to the interpretation that skepticism’s inquiry could be completed. This would allow it to demonstrate that for every argument there will always be an [End Page 143] equally persuasive counterargument. He also interprets skepticism as accepting a metaphysical principle regarding the inherent instability of objects.“A Short History of the Problem of Beginning,” chapter 2, provides a detailed précis of Hegel’s essay. It also gives the brief history of the problem of beginning, discussing Descartes, Kant, Reinhold, Fichte, and Schelling. It notes that some philosophers posit an objective beginning, others a subjective beginning. It explains why Hegel regards previous attempts to solve the problem of beginning as inadequate. It recognizes that Fichte’s solution can be interpreted as much closer to that of Hegel than Hegel acknowledges.Chapter 3, “The Problem of Beginning,” supplies Hegel’s own account of the problem. His solution has two versions, one in the Science of Logic and the other in the Encyclopedia Logic. Each version posits a beginning without determinate content. In the Science of Logic, Hegel states that absolute knowing, the culminating shape of consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit, corresponds to the empty thinking with which philosophy begins. Philosophy’s beginning in the Science of Logic is mediate as it emerges from the progression of shapes of consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit and immediate as it does not have an object of thought. In the Encyclopedia Logic, Hegel proposes that a completed skepticism corresponds to the abstract concept of being with which philosophy begins. Philosophy’s beginning in the Encyclopedia Logic is mediate as it emerges from the skepticism’s equipollence and immediate as being without content. Hegel ultimately denies that a completed skepticism could play this role, however, which suggests that he believes that philosophy can begin immediately.“Meditation I—Phenomenology,” chapter 4, argues that Hegel’s first version is unsuccessful. To succeed, William Maker’s interpretation would have to be accepted, which... (shrink)

Using Putnam’s brain-in-a-vat thought experiment, this article argues that interpretations which assert that Hegel’s philosophy, or some portion of it, develops inan entirely a priori manner are incoherent. An alternative reading is then articulated.

This article argues that Hegel read Lacan. Put less paradoxically, it claims that situating Hegel within a Lacanian paradigm results in an understanding of the future as still open and of history as not ended. Absolute knowing, on this model, is the recognition of the way in which history has developed, not a claim that it can advance no further. The article aims to persuade those who might otherwise dismiss Hegel – for example, persons au courant with poststructuralism – (...) that he still can make a decisive contribution to current debates. (shrink)

Joshua Anderson argues that Amartya Sen’s reading of the Bhagavadgītā is not accurate and so it cannot serve as an example of Sen’s comprehensive consequentialism. This article presents Sen’s reading of the Bhagavadgītā and Anderson’s criticisms of Sen’s readings. It discusses three types of readers: history readers, activist readers, and interventionist readers. It gives an interventionist reading of the Bhagavadgītā, supplementing Arjuna’s reasons and contesting those of Kṛṣṇa. It shows that Arjuna’s reasons are cogent and it respectfully argues that Kṛṣṇa’s (...) arguments are incomplete and unconvincing. Even if Arjuna’s reasons are not ultimately decisive, they legitimately feature in his deliberations. It responds to Anderson, urging that Sen correctly advocates comprehensive consequentialism and agent-relativity, rather than cumulative outcomes and agent-neutrality, and that Sen correctly sees these contrasts exemplified in the Bhagavadgītā. It concludes with a discussion of the impartial spectator, kin,.. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 10.2 (2003) 133-134 [Access article in PDF] Fictional Beings J. M. Coetzee What Does It Mean, "To Understand"? A tennis coach is teaching a young player a forehand topspin drive. He does so with a mixture of demonstrations (nonverbal) and explanations (verbal), such as, "At the moment of impact you roll the wrist over like this" (demonstrates). The player tries the stroke again and again, (...) and each time the coach shakes his head and says, "You haven't got it yet." Then the player gets the stroke right. The coach says "Now you've got it! Now you understand! Now let's do it again!"Is this a legitimate use of the word understand? I think it is. The coach intends the following: At first you may have understood my words but from your actions—the practice strokes you played—I could not see that you had understood my meaning. Then, when you got the stroke right, and could repeat it, I saw that you had finally understood the meaning behind my words.Understanding is in this case the effective translation of words, or words plus demonstrations, into actions, where effectiveness can be easily measured. The translation is from a verbal, or mixed verbal, system into an entirely nonverbal system of electrochemical impulses.Conversely, one can picture an exhaustive analysis of forehand topspin drives by André Agassi, conducted by microphotography, implanted sensors, and so on, to issue in a mixed verbal and diagrammatic account of how Agassi plays the stroke. In this case the physiologic system of the stroke has been successfully translated into a (partially) verbal system. Again, it would be meaningful to say that the sports physiologist who does the analysis has come to understand how the stroke is played.Although in both these cases understanding is conceived of as a translation process, I concentrate from here onward on the translation process from the verbal to the nonverbal, exemplified by understanding how to play a particular stroke.The coach says X and the player tries to "do" X, but fails and fails, until finally he succeeds. When the player has at last "done" X, he has understood. Thereafter, by steps, the player ceases to depend on the coach and the coach's X: the player can do X by himself; he understands X in the sense that whenever he says X to himself he can do X. He has made X his own.I read The Sound and the Fury, the part devoted to Benjy. Benjy says X and I don't understand. I understand the words on the page one by one, many of the sentences I understand one by one in the sense that I can translate them into other English sentences, but I don't understand the logic that gets Benjy from one sentence to the next, I don't understand the references of many words that are usually referential, and sometimes I am baffled by the syntax.For whatever reason, I go on reading Benjy. In a few respects I begin to understand better. For instance, there are sentences that stop in midstride, and I begin to suspect that such sentences stop because Benjy does not want to think what [End Page 133] comes next—that is to say, that the Faulkner behind Benjy means me to understand that Benjy lacks the wherewithal to face what would naturally come next. Mainly, however, I remain in the dark.Then I begin to experience something interesting. I find that I am, in my mind, going through some of the movements of Benjy's language. I am, as it were, practicing the characteristic strokes of his game. Although I remain, for the most part, unable to translate his pages into connected discourse—that is, into a discourse in which the logical connection between one sentence and the next is, however faulty, at least clear—I am better and better able to "do" Benjy."Doing" Benjy in this case means more than parrot-like repetition of Benjy's words. I can now speak of "entering Benjy" in a way that makes sense. I... (shrink)

In these days no edition of a classic, least of all of a ‘new’ classic, can claim to be final; and since the able editor of the Cambridge Herodas has found reason to reconsider some of his readings, there is clearly room for an independent examination of the text. This paper embodies the result of several weeks' close study of the papyrus in 1923 and 1924. To save space I have begun a note with a new line only where it (...) is of more than usual interest. By the use of a letter of thicker type I mean that there are traces consistent with that letter, but not necessarily with that alone—which seems to me the only way by which Herodas can be saved from the restorer who regards doubtful letter-traces as equivalent to a gap. I begin with three passages which seem to me to stand in a class apart. (shrink)

The nonmetaphysical interpretation of Hegel's philosophy asserts that the metaphysical reading is not credible and so his philosophy must be rationally reconstructed so as to elide its metaphysical aspects. This article shows that the thesis of the extended mind approaches the metaphysical reading, thereby undermining denials of its credibility and providing the resources to articulate and defend the metaphysical reading of Hegel's philosophy. This fully rehabilitates the metaphysical Hegel. The article does not argue for the truth of the metaphysical Hegel's (...) claims. Rather, it defends the correctness of reading his philosophy as metaphysical. (shrink)

1. 1.5.3. The unanimous manuscript reading for this passage is The idea of an looking for an seems alien to Greek thought, and the expression is not derived from any traceable proverb. A small correction produces the reading which restores sense, and produces a meaning which is much more in line with the requirements of the passage. The corruption may well have arisen from the penchant which scribes had for making minor alterations to restore what they conceived to be the (...) required grammar of the immediate context. (shrink)

1. 1.5.3. The unanimous manuscript reading for this passage is The idea of an looking for an seems alien to Greek thought, and the expression is not derived from any traceable proverb. A small correction produces the reading which restores sense, and produces a meaning which is much more in line with the requirements of the passage. The corruption may well have arisen from the penchant which scribes had for making minor alterations to restore what they conceived to be the (...) required grammar of the immediate context. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Exploring the Depth of Dream Experience: The Enactive Framework and Methods for Neurophenomenological Research” by Elizaveta Solomonova & Xin Wei Sha. Upshot: This commentary aims to sharpen the conceptual distinction between the breadth and the depth of dream experience. I discuss several possible readings and argue that the best one construes breadth and depth as distinct but complimentary research strategies distinguished not just by the kinds of evidence they rely on, but also by the (...) degree to which different types of data are integrated and focused on the same experiential episode. I identify promising candidates for depth approaches and challenges for future research. (shrink)

SOME suggestions are here made for improvement of the text and understanding of Pliny's Eastern Aegean geography. The editions studied for the purpose are Detlefsen's special edition of the geographical books and Mayhoff's Teubner vol. i . The citations of MSS. readings given below are normally taken from Mayhoff's apparatus, which gives a fuller coverage than Detlefsen's. The MSS. are cited by the letters given them in Mayhoff's edition and the Budé Pliny book i , pp. 37 f. One further (...) MS., hitherto not collated in the geographical books, is here cited. Following Campbell, who first drew attention to it, I cite it as c. This MS., formerly in the Phillipps collection in Cheltenham and now in the Pierpont Morgan Library , is assigned to Lorsch and said to be of the first half of the ninth century. It seems thus to be somewhat older than A and E, and in that case is the oldest known surviving MS. of the geographical books. (shrink)

SOME suggestions are here made for improvement of the text and understanding of Pliny's Eastern Aegean geography. The editions studied for the purpose are Detlefsen's special edition of the geographical books and Mayhoff's Teubner vol. i. The citations of MSS. readings given below are normally taken from Mayhoff's apparatus, which gives a fuller coverage than Detlefsen's. The MSS. are cited by the letters given them in Mayhoff's edition and the Budé Pliny book i, pp. 37 f. One further MS., hitherto (...) not collated in the geographical books, is here cited. Following Campbell, who first drew attention to it, I cite it as c. This MS., formerly in the Phillipps collection in Cheltenham and now in the Pierpont Morgan Library, is assigned to Lorsch and said to be of the first half of the ninth century. It seems thus to be somewhat older than A and E, and in that case is the oldest known surviving MS. of the geographical books. (shrink)

Le philosophe américain Charles S. Peirce ne trouva, malgré ses efforts, guère d'interlocuteurs en France. On le considéra comme un mathématicien et logicien, un physicien et un psychologue fiable, mais son œuvre philosophique fut systématique­ment distordue au gré des controverses franco-françaises. Nous mettons l'accent sur les lectures d'André Lalande et de Louis Couturat qui contribuèrent néanmoins à faire reconnaître en France l'originalité du père du pragmaticisme. Despite his efforts, the American philosopher Charles S. Peirce found hardly any interlocutors in France. (...) He was considered mostly as a mathematician and logician, a physicist and a reliable psychologist, but his philosophical work was systematically distorted in consequence of "Franco-French" disputes. We emphasize here the read­ings of André Lalande and Louis Couturat who made significant contributions towards the recognition in France of the originality of the founding father of Pragmaticism. (shrink)

Chomsky is widely mentioned in those philosophical circles whose interest centers on the analysis of language, but until now he has really been little read; this new work will remedy that situation. Here Chomsky, building on a presupposed acquaintance with linguistics, provides a stimulating examination of four major areas of linguistic theory: first, generative grammars are studied in their relation to language learning and understanding, then they are further considered as theories of linguistic use and competence; Chomsky here sets (...) out the criteria required for a grammar to be considered adequate—the justification of grammars. The second chapter examines syntactic theory with reference to depth structure and the problem of the relation of syntactic description to the traditional, correct account of how language is used. Depth structures and their import with reference to transformations within grammars are the subject matter of the third chapter. The last section considers, among other problems, the interface between syntax and semantics, especially the problems of degrees of grammaticality. A number of notes which go further into certain topics appear after the main text, and there is a useful bibliography. The main thrust of the book is a syntactical treatment of natural language by using transformational generative grammars as descriptive. Although he suggests empirical tests for the models he has constructed, he does not provide an attempt to fully verify the proposed system. This book will certainly be essential for an understanding of the structure of language viewed from the syntactic point of view.—P. J. M. (shrink)

This volume contains papers and abstracts of papers delivered at the colloquium at Tihany, Hungary in 1962. There were seven sections; mathematical logic, computers and automata theory, circuit theory, mathematical linguistics, computers and programming, applications of computers in economics, artificial intelligence. Among the more interesting—to the reviewer—were these papers: one by Church concerning an independence problem in recursive arithmetic; Muller—characterizing classes of recursive functions; a long and philosophically stimulating study by Watanabe on a formalization of inductive logic; Kiefer—applications of set (...) theoretic techniques in linguistics; Abraham and Salapina—recognition of synonymity by machine; Gelernter—problem-solving graphs and heuristic programming. A number of papers which were read are not included in this volume.—P. J. M. (shrink)

This is the first comprehensive study of the sublime in Lucan. Drawing upon renewed literary-critical interest in the tradition of philosophical aesthetics, Henry Day argues that the category of the sublime offers a means of moving beyond readings of Lucan's Bellum Civile in terms of the poem's political commitment or, alternatively, nihilism. Demonstrating in dialogue with theorists from Burke and Kant to Freud, Lyotard and Ankersmit the continuing vitality of Longinus' foundational treatise On the Sublime, Day charts Lucan's complex and (...) instructive exploration of the relationship between sublimity and ethical discourses of freedom and oppression. Through the Bellum Civile's cataclysmic vision of civil war and metapoetic accounts of its own genesis, through its heated linguistic texture and proclaimed effects upon future readers and, most powerfully of all, through its representation of its twin protagonists Caesar and Pompey, Lucan's great epic emerges as a central text in the history of the sublime. (shrink)

Professor Hospers has produced a most competent text-book, with ‘selected readings’ and ‘exercises’ added to each chapter. He has in mind in the first place undergraduates in American universities; but anyone who wishes to familiarize himself with the methods and approaches to philosophy current in universities in England and the United States will find in this book a useful guide. Philosophy is seen as a critical and purgative activity. It is assumed that if we become clear about the logic of (...) our language a great many of the traditional problems of philosophy disappear or look very different. At least one is inclined to suppose that this is Professor Hospers’s assumption, though he is on the whole a little cagey about showing his own hand; and it may be significant that the name of Wittgenstein does not occur in the Index and that there is no discussion of Professor Ryle’s Concept of Mind—in particular, one is surprised to find no extended discussion of dispositional concepts. The section dealing with ‘the mental and the physical’, admirable though it is, has thus a somewhat old-fashioned appearance. (shrink)

Mr. Gellner’s book achieved a succès de scandale before it had been out very long. Professor Ryle’s refusal to have it reviewed in Mind on the ground that it was abusive and levelled accusations of disingenuousness against identifiable teachers of philosophy provoked in the columns of The Times an impassioned exchange of letters in the course of which a great many issues were firmly knotted together beyond all reasonable possibilities of disentanglement. The Thunderer summed up in favour of Mr. Gellner (...) and Lord Russell in what must be the first leader devoted to a philosophical topic within living memory. Such a hubbub could scarcely, in our culture, have been provoked by purely philosophical differences. It has in fact been a party fight in which much more than philosophical differences have been at stake. The position of Oxford in relation to the provincial universities and the University of London; the connexion of philosophers with the cultural ‘establishment’; the obscure mechanisms by which reputations among professional philosophers are made and marred and advancement secured or frustrated; all these and other issues have been caught up into the controversy. All these issues are in fact raised by Mr. Gellner in his book, and legitimately enough from his point of view—he is a philosopher who is now professionally concerned with sociology—; but the nature of his book, as a critical account of certain philosophical doctrines and simultaneously a treatment of these doctrines as ‘ideology’, that is, as in some sense doctrines the rationale of which can only be understood in terms of obscure social motivations, presents the philosophical reviewer with some difficulties. Any such reviewer is bound to rise up from a reading of Words and Things with strong feelings of sympathy for Professor Ryle, even if he takes the view that the refusal to arrange for a review in Mind was, so to speak, strategically wrong and tactically absurd. (shrink)

This is a collection of papers read at an international logic colloquium held at Oxford in 1963. The first half contains articles on intuitionistic and modal logics, the propositional calculus, and languages with infinitely long expressions by such logicians as Kripke, Bull, Harrop, and Tait. The second part is primarily concerned with recursive functions and features a monograph by Crossley on constructive order types, as well as contributions by Goodstein, Schütte, and Wang, among others. Especially noteworthy is Kripke's paper (...) which applies Cohen's methods to the semantics of intuitionistic logic.—P. J. M. (shrink)

As inductive logic and the philosophy of probability theory have become of wider interest, it has become clear that a book of readings in these and related topics would be useful for courses since most of the important articles are scattered and inaccessible. The editors have fashioned an extensive collection of papers in four main areas: the meaning of probability, confirmation theory, simplicity of theories and structures, the justification of induction. Each chapter is preceded by an introduction which sets out (...) the basic problems of the topic under consideration. There are thirty-six papers in all, two-thirds of them in the first and last chapters. The first chapter includes articles by Ramsey, Carnap, Nagel, and Reichenbach. The second chapter is dominated by the work of Hempel, Oppenheim, and Kemeny; the third chapter features a long article by D. J. Hillman which takes as its basis the work of Goodman, and there are other papers by Bunge, Quine, and Barker. The discussion of induction and its justification contains articles by Hume and Mill, but the bulk of the papers are contemporary. There is a bibliography for each chapter at the end of the book.—P. J. M. (shrink)

In this, his first book, originally published in 1926, Henry Nelson Wieman sets forth a view on the relationship of religious experience and scientific method which in substance he has maintained ever since. According to Wieman, our knowledge of the concrete world consists of immediate sensuous experience as interpreted through some set of concepts. Religious experience is the richest form of immediate sensuous experience. It is our awareness of God, who is as much an object of experience as are tree (...) and hill and stone. And scientific method is the systematic procedure by which the conceptual network for interpreting immediate sensuous experience is clarified and corrected, with the experience-concept compound thus becoming "science." Religious experience, therefore, receives its most adequate interpretation in science; while science, in turn, receives its most stimulating input from religious experience. In principle, the highest of the individual sciences is theology; in fact, however, the very complexity of religious experience and the difficulty of distinguishing it clearly from other types of immediate sensuous experience have prevented more than merely minimal progress in achieving a truly scientific theology. On the whole our ideas about God are marked by confusion and controversy, therefore, despite the fact that some of these notions probably are true. Wieman’s book serves as an excellent example of the liberal thought which dominated much of theology and philosophy-of-religion during the last part of the nineteenth century and the first part of the twentieth. The religious thinker with a liberal perspective conceives his primary challenge as developing a scientifically acceptable interpretation of religious experience, taking that experience itself as being obvious and almost universally recognized. One need not be particularly well read to know that current judgments regarding the obviousness of religious experience are hardly so sanguine, however, and that the religious thinker typical of our own age therefore conceives his primary challenge quite differently.—J. M. V. (shrink)

Butchvarov is chairman of the department of philosophy at the University of Iowa. His book, a contribution to a new series, the Northwestern University Publications in Analytical Philosophy, deals with "the conceptual foundations of epistemology." It is divided into four main parts. The first undertakes an account of the general concept of knowledge. The second treats the objects of a priori knowledge; the third, the nature of primary a posteriori knowledge. The fourth part regards nondemonstrative inference and the nature of (...) derivative knowledge in general. The focus of the book is upon fundamental epistemic concepts rather than such particular issues as knowledge of the future, of bodies, of other minds, etc. Butchvarov urges that such specialized problems be treated only after the general conceptual framework has been investigated, lest one's common-sense opinions on the former unduly influence his philosophical conclusions as to the latter. For the inherent demands of the discipline itself must be respected: "In philosophy, as in any other purely theoretical discipline, it is better to be wrong as the result of inquiry and argument than to be right as the result of mere conviction." One of the author's central conclusions concerns evidential criteria. One unquestionable criterion of evidence is the impossibility of mistake, the "demonstrative" criterion. Is there, in addition, any "nondemonstrative" criterion of evidence, with the consequent possibility of nondemonstrative derivative knowledge or at least nondemonstrative rational belief? While not ruling out the possibility of such a criterion, Butchvarov judges that at least one has not yet been brought forth. Particular criteria proposed as nondemonstrative, such as inductive and behavioral, either presuppose the demonstrative criterion or else lack intelligible content. More generally, the nondemonstrative criterion either would or would not possess something in common with the demonstrative criterion, such that both could be understood as species of the same genus, "criterion of evidence." But no successful attempt has thus far been made in showing just what this shared trait might be; and the thesis that there can be multiple criteria of evidence without any generic commonality equivocates on the very notion of evidence. It follows, therefore, that knowledge and rational belief are much more restricted than one would ordinarily surmise. This book manifests both the scholar's mastery of his field and the teacher's concern for clear, well-structured presentation. It reads well, employs good examples, and includes the all-important index.--J. M. V. (shrink)

Anders Nygren is widely known among English-speaking readers for his subtle and scholarly analysis of the forms of love, Agape and Eros, first published in 1930. Important facets of his far-ranging thought, however, have remained largely inaccessible to those who do not read Swedish. The present volume is a significant step in reducing that inaccessibility. Nygren's work is treated by seventeen different contributors in essays grouped under the following headings: Philosophy of Religion, Motif Research, The Meanings of Love, Systematic (...) Theology, Ethics, and Cultural and Ecumenical Concerns. Yet the book is more than merely a Festschrift. Over ten years in preparation, it aims at criticism as well as interpretation; and it includes an introductory "intellectual autobiography" by Nygren himself, a concluding response by Nygren to each of his critics, and a complete bibliography chronicling the 372 items published by Nygren from 1918 through 1970. Nygren's investigations fall on both sides of the line between philosophy and theology. The interest which unifies these inquiries is the philosophy of religion. "It is above all in the philosophy of religion that the great decisions are finally made." Nygren's earliest work was an attempt to establish the philosophy of religion on a purely scientific basis. It was in this regard that he developed his characteristic method of "motif research." Just as the supreme theoretical, aesthetic, and ethical categories are the true, the beautiful, and the good, respectively, so the supreme religious category is the eternal. All these categories are merely formal, however, and one must turn to the particular for content. Now, content in the theoretical domain consists of factual relationships; but content in the remaining three, "atheoretical," domains consists of the values or "fundamental motifs" which have been chosen from among a limited number of basic alternatives by a given historical group. The scholar forms a hypothesis regarding the fundamental motifs of the group in question; and if this hypothesis is verified by historical research, it then serves as a principle for organizing additional data concerning the group. Thus, the philosopher-historian of religion studies groups in an effort to determine their answers to the question, "What is the eternal?" It is chiefly in this domain that Nygren has applied his method, concluding, for example, that "agape" and "eros" are the characteristic Christian and Greek answers, respectively, to the fundamental religious question. Nygren maintains that this approach provides the means for treating the religious question systematically while simultaneously respecting the vast historical diversity of specific religious content. Just as the method of motif research is central to Nygren's work, so the discussion of that method and its applications constitutes, in effect, the central matter of this book. The project is carried off well. Nygren's final commentary is especially welcome, confirming or correcting positions presented by the contributors as his, and accepting or rejecting positions advanced by the contributors as their own.--J. M. V. (shrink)

John Locke's treatises on government make frequent reference to the Hebrew Bible, while references to the New Testament are almost completely absent. To date, scholarship has not addressed this surprising characteristic of the treatises. In this book, Yechiel Leiter offers a Hebraic reading of Locke's fundamental political text. In doing so, he formulates a new school of thought in Lockean political interpretation and challenges existing ones. He shows how a grasp of the Hebraic underpinnings of Locke's political theory resolves many (...) of the problems, as well as scholarly debates, that are inherent in reading Locke. More than a book about the political theory of John Locke, this volume is about the foundational ideas of western civilization. While focused on Locke's Hebraism, it demonstrates the persistent relevance of the biblical political narrative to modernity. It will generate interest among students of Locke and political theory; philosophy and early modern history; and within Bible study communities. (shrink)

This book is the most comprehensive edition and study so far of a minor pre-Socratic. Besides a collection of testimonia and fragments more complete than Diels/kranz, Reale’s study includes a thorough commentary on all the Ancient texts and an extended introduction as well as five useful indices. The superb commentary dealing with textual and linguistic questions must be read in close connection with the introduction that discusses all the important philosophical problems. The monograph-like introduction contains numerous new interpretations and (...) has important observations on Eleatic philosophy. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThere is an ongoing debate in New Testament scholarship on the correct interpretation of Paul’s pistis Christou formulations: are we justified by our own faith/trust in Christ, or by participating in Christ’s faith and faithfulness towards God? This article contributes to the position of purposeful or sustained ambiguity by reading Paul’s imitation – and faith – language against the background of Hellenistic-Roman thought on and practice of imitation. In particular, the mimetic chain between teachers and students training for a philosophical (...) disposition, and the philosophical topos of ‘becoming like God’ offer material valuable for comparison. Since pistis, fides and cognates are used in these settings as both a quality to imitate and as attitude towards a model, and since, conversely, imitation is very much involved in Paul’s pistis-vocabulary, it makes sense to read pistis Christou as shorthand for a mimetic movement of faith via Christ towards God. (shrink)